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CHAPTER I
Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private
Monitoring
1.1 Introduction
A repeated game is a stylized model of a long-term relationship. The most common solution
concepts for repeated games are Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) and its extension to imperfect
public monitoring, Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE). In both cases, equilibrium strategies depend
only on commonly observed histories. This yields a recursive property that every continuation game
is equivalent to the entire game. Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (APS) pursued this logic in 1986 and
1990, and so characterized equilibrium payoffs using methods inspired by dynamic programming.
APS built on Green and Porter’s 1984 seminal exposition of dynamic Cournot oligopoly — who
in turn took inspiration from Stigler’s influential (1964) theory of dynamic Bertrand oligopoly. To
sustain collusion in a world with hidden pricing, Stigler had proposed that firms initiate a price war
if standard statistical tests suggested cartel cheating. Stigler struggled with a problem that afflicts
much of economic theory — i.e, any dynamic setting with unobserved payoff-relevant actions that do
not just feed into an observable stochastic aggregate, like an observed price. It is arguably important
in all long-term partnerships ranging from relational contracting to international political relations.
Restricting attention to public signals intuitively ignores strategically relevant information, and
misses the potential richness of the dynamic structure. Upon reflection, public monitoring should
only be justified as a tractable approximation of this richer private monitoring “reality”. So then,
how restrictive is it? Exactly how much does private monitoring expand the scope for collusion in
oligopoly, eg? Our finding is: substantially, in some cases.
Unfortunately, not only is private monitoring an interesting problem, it is also a difficult one.
And thus Stigler’s question remains unsolved after so much time. For as is well-known, private
monitoring in repeated games induces correlated private histories, and this frustrates attempts
1
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to use recursive methods, as in APS. On a sequential equilibrium path, continuation play in any
period constitutes a correlated equilibrium, where the private histories act as endogenous correlation
devices. And computing a best response in a non-trivial sequential equilibrium may well require an
impossibly complicated probabilistic inference. It is no surprise that Kandori (2002) calls this “one
of the best known long-standing open questions in economic theory.”
Though incentives are harder to provide with unobserved actions, the induced correlation may
facilitate coordination (as in Aumann 1974, 1987), and augment the sequential equilibrium payoff
set. So motivated, we explicitly incorporate correlated private histories, as first studied by Lehrer
(1992). But our approach admits arbitrary correlation each period. First, we develop a new
solution concept for infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring that reflects these correlation
possibilities. Whereas APS defined an operator that took the Nash equilibria of the ‘auxiliary game’
at the start of every subgame, we take correlated equilibria. This is a well-defined exercise since we
publicize past correlated recommendations. The largest fixed point of the resulting operator yields
the Markov Perfect Correlated Equilibrium (MPCE) payoff set, and is therefore recursive like PPE.
Notably, not only is our solution concept tractable, it is arguably easier to compute than is the PPE
set. For unlike Nash equilibrium, the set of correlated equilibria can be found by linear methods.
We then explore the implications of MPCE for repeated games of private monitoring. We show
that for any monitoring structure, the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs is contained within the
MPCE payoff set for the corresponding expected stage game. This helps us deduce the tightest
bound on repeated game equilibrium payoffs that is independent of the monitoring structure.
Our paper has two parts. We begin with an infinitely repeated game of observed actions, and
embellish it with an extensive-form correlation device that can generate any (possibly) history-
dependent private messages every period. Since messages are made public after players act, a
recursive structure emerges. Unlike Prokopovych (2006) who first took this road, we then show
that a Markovian device suffices to describe all equilibrium payoffs. This yields our MPCE solution
concept. Theorem I.1 characterizes the resulting payoff set — it is compact, convex, and nonde-
creasing in the discount factor. Also, it contains all subgame perfect payoffs. Theorem I.2 describes
a tractable, recursive algorithm for computing it.
In the second thrust, we turn to a repeated game of private monitoring, and relate its sequential
equilibria to the MPCE of the corresponding repetition of the expected stage game. Theorem I.3
asserts that this set serves as an upper bound for the sequential equilibrium payoffs. We thereby
identify the certainly unattainable sequential equilibrium payoffs for a repeated game of private
3
monitoring for any fixed discount factor. Notably this bound holds for all monitoring structures, as
well as private strategies in public monitoring games. In other words, we precisely compute the set
of payoffs potentially added by the richer information structure introduced by private monitoring
— one possible completion of Stigler’s original thought.
Theorem I.4 explores how our payoff upper bound can be made tight. For unlike MPCE, a
standard repeated game of private monitoring with an initial period does not allow any pre-play
signals. So motivated, we augment the MPCE concept. We compute the Nash equilibrium payoffs
of all auxiliary games using continuation payoffs drawn from the MPCE set. Put differently, this
applies the APS operator to the MPCE payoff set. Any payoff in the resulting set can be supported
as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game with some monitoring structure. We therefore obtain
the tightest possible bound that makes no reference to the monitoring structure.
Research on repeated games with private monitoring has been driven by the folk theorem, and so
proceeded by finding computable classes of sequential equilibria. In contrast, we provide a superset
of the equilibrium payoff set. The earliest work found nearly efficient equilibria that dispense with
all but a simple summary of past play. Loosely, these “belief-based” approaches focus on the chance
of misleading private messages. This is possible when the monitoring is sufficiently accurate (e.g.
Sekiguchi 1997, and Bhaskar and Obara 2002). A clever and recursive set of non-trivial equilibria
in which players’ beliefs are irrelevant was later identified by Piccione (2002) and Ely and Valimaki
(2002), and greatly extended by Ely, Horner, and Olszewski (2005). While this belief-free approach
constitutes a strict subset of all sequential equilibrium payoffs and requires sufficiently patient
players, it often secures a folk theorem.
Our paper is not intended in any way as a contribution to the folk theorem literature. For we
shift from characterizing what is a sequential equilibrium, to what is not. Abreu, Milgrom, and
Pearce (1991) call into question the relevance of a folk theorem in this setting. Since a discounted
repeated game unjustifiably entwines time preference and the frequency of monitoring, the discrete
time folk theorem logic yields more informative monitoring with more rapid play. A large discount
factor is an appropriate modeling choice only if opportunities to observe others’ actions are frequent.
Though Coca Cola and Pepsi can change prices arbitrarily often, without similarly (and implausibly)
frequent reports of their rivals’ actions, they will change behavior only as often as information
arrives. The analysis of dynamic oligopoly in Green and Porter (1984) was meaningful precisely
because of the fixed discount factor. Our analysis sheds light on equilibrium payoffs when the folk
theorem does not apply — such as when interaction is not very frequent, or when information
4
revelation about unobserved actions inherently cannot be accelerated. Instead our paper offers
definitive insights on payoffs for those applications with a fixed discount factor.
In arguing that the Cournot-Nash outcome was the wrong benchmark for deducing collusion
Porter (1983) wrote: “Industrial organization economists have recognized for some time that the
problem of distinguishing empirically between collusive and noncooperative behavior, in the absence
of a ‘smoking gun’, is a difficult one.” Firms can achieve higher payoffs in a fully compliant,
noncooperative fashion. Combining this insight with our approach, we allow that firms might avail
themselves of correlated information, and potentially achieve more outcomes. Our MPCE solution
concept is agnostic about the details of who knows what and when. In this way, MPCE is a better
litmus test of cheating for regulators to rule out the possibility of collusion; otherwise, one might
mistakenly assert an antitrust violation.
The paper is organized as follows. We gently begin with a motivational example. Next, we
discuss infinitely repeated games of perfect monitoring with an extensive form correlation device,
and develop our new MPCE solution concept. We illustrate it by returning to our example. We then
formally describe infinitely repeated games with private monitoring, and compare their sequential
equilibrium payoffs with the MPCE payoffs of standard repeated games. Here, we establish our
payoff upper bound and show that it can be tight. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1.2 Motivational Example
A. Analysis of a Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Consider an infinitely repeated two player game of perfect monitoring with payoffs given by
Figure 1.1. The players share the discount factor 3/4, and so are not patient enough to support the
cooperative outcome in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Stahl (1991) shows that even with public
correlation, the set of SPE payoffs is the convex hull of {(0, 0), (7, 0), (0, 7)}, and thus the highest
symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium payoff is (7/2, 7/2). If instead we have imperfect public




Figure 1.1: Example Stage Game
1Kandori (1992) shows that the PPE set is monotone in the informativeness (in the sense of Blackwell (1953)) of
the public signal. Specifically, the PPE payoff set weakly shrinks when the public signal is garbled.
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Next, suppose that players privately observe a payoff irrelevant signal from {g, b} before play each
period. The signal profiles {(g, g), (g, b), (b, g)} occur with probabilities (1/2, 1/4, 1/4), respectively,
independently of the past. After actions are chosen, the private signal profile is commonly revealed
to both players. To simplify matters, assume players can access a public correlation device that
draws a number z from a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
Consider the strategy profile: “In phase 1, play C after observing g, and D after b. If agents
play the same action, then repeat phase 1. Otherwise, if player i = 1, 2 alone plays D, then proceed
to phase 2-i, where player i plays C and player −i mixes so that i gets an expected payoff of 0. If
both players play C, then stay in phase 2-i. Otherwise, return to phase 1.”
When the repeated game is enriched by the signal process, these strategies constitute a sequential
equilibrium. The equilibrium payoff for each player is
v = (1/4)(4(1/2)− 13(1/4) + 20(1/4)) + (3/4)(v(1/2) + 2v(1/4) + 0(1/4))
i.e. v = 15/4. When called upon to play C, a player will acquiesce because
(1/4)(4(1/2)− 13(1/4)) + (3/4)((15/4)(1/2)+ 2(15/4)(1/4)) ≥ (1/4)20(1/2)
At the start of phase 1, both players expect the payoff 15/4. In phase 2-i, player i expects a payoff
of 0 and player −i expects 15/2. The payoff (15/4, 15/4) Pareto dominates the highest symmetric
subgame perfect equilibrium payoff (7/2, 7/2) attainable without any signals. In fact, (15/4, 15/4)
dominates any symmetric PPE payoff attainable under any imperfect public monitoring structure.
Nevertheless, (15/4, 15/4) can be attained in an MPCE because both the information and strategies
depend only on the most recent period.
This example reflects two truths: (a) relative to public monitoring, private monitoring may
greatly expand the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs, and (b) MPCE captures these richer
information structures and the larger payoff set.
For a bigger picture insight, consider the intuition in Kandori (2008). Although correlation
cannot enhance play in the one-shot prisoners’ dilemma, the repeated game instead confronts play-
ers with a game of chicken. This auxiliary game admits nontrivial correlated equilibria. Thus,
imperfectly correlated signals can have a meaningful dynamic strategic effect.
More specifically, in this game the gain to defecting is higher when the other player cooperates
than when he defects since 20 − 4 = 16 > 0 − (−13) = 13. But our correlating signal confuses
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the players about what action profile is played in any period. Consequently, the temptation to
cheat is a weighted average of 16 and 13, and so smaller than if no correlation were available. This
correlation is not without a cost, since the equilibrium prescribes the most efficient payoff (4, 4) less
often.
B. Economic Settings
We now argue that this example captures a wide range of economic settings.
Repeated Partnership. A theorist and an empiricist seek to write a paper together. At the start
of each day, they independently choose whether to exert high effort or low effort (actions C and D in
the example,respectively). They meet at the end of every day to demonstrate their accomplishments.
Suppose, however, that they entertain subjective interpretations of their colleague’s effort (as in
MacLeod (2003) and Fuchs (2007)). Each colleague entertains either a good (g) or bad (b) subjective
interpretation, corresponding to high or low effort by his colleague, respectively. For example, the
empiricist’s regression output is commonly observed, but the theorist cannot accurately gauge the
effort required to produce the results. A key additional source of discounting here is that the
partnership might end.
Principal-Agency. An employee chooses each period to exert either high or low effort (actions C
and D in the example, respectively). His manager simultaneously chooses one of two compensation
schemes: pay a bonus for high output, or never pay a bonus (actions C and D in the example). The
private signals can take one of the following two interpretations. In the first, private signals are non-
binding recommendations to managers and employees made by a board of directors. The board’s
fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder value would justify influencing the relational contracts
implemented by the firm. In the second, the private signals are subjective evaluations of output
made by the agents. MacLeod (2003) characterizes the optimal contract when the joint density of
the subjective evaluations is given. With MPCE one can study this context while being agnostic
about the exact structure of the agents’ subjectivity.
Dynamic Quality Choice. A single product firm has one long-run customer and can use higher
or lower quality inputs (actions C and D). A product with better inputs yields higher performance.
Without observing the firm’s input choice, the customer decides whether or not to purchase the
item (actions C and D). After each period, the firm and the customer each observe a private signal
indicating a good (g) or bad (b) performing product.
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Secret Price Cuts. Thus the actions C and D in the inspirational example from Stigler (1964)
represent high and low prices, while the private signals g and b may correspond to high and low
demand.
1.3 A Mediated Repeated Game
We begin with a repeated game of perfect monitoringG(δ), played in periods 1, 2, . . ., and payoffs
discounted by the factor 0 < δ < 1. Each period, every player i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n} chooses an
action ai from a finite action set Ai. An action profile a is thus an element of A =
∏
iAi, the set of
pure action profiles.2 Payoffs given the action profile a are u(a) = (u1(a), . . . , un(a)). Let αi denote
the mixed action for player i that chooses action ai ∈ Ai with chance αi(ai). Abusing notation,
u(α) = (u1(α), . . . , un(α)) denotes the expected payoffs from the mixture α. As usual, this stage
game has a Nash equilibrium. Let V be its set of feasible and individually rational payoffs.
We embellish the infinitely repeated game G(δ) with a correlation device that sends private
messages to players each period conditional on the action history. The device makes public the
private message profile after play concludes each period. Before each period (including the first),
each player privately receives a message ãi ∈ Ai, which we interpret as a recommendation to
play action ai. By Aumann (1987), restricting messages to recommendations is without loss of
generality.3 Players commonly observe the null history h1 = ∅ before play begins. A history ht =
(a1, ã1, . . . , at−1, ãt−1) is a complete record of all past outcomes in periods 1, 2, . . . , t− 1, i.e. pairs
of action and recommendation profiles. The history ht is commonly observed by all players at the
start of period t. Let Ht be the set of all histories ht, and H = ⋃∞t=1 Ht the set of all histories of
any length.
A (direct) correlation device µ is a probability measure on the set of action profiles A. An
extensive form correlation device is a sequence of functions λ = (λt)∞t=1 such that (λ
t : Ht →
∆(A))∞t=1, and Λ is the space of all such functions.
4 The interpretation is that after history ht, the
correlation device selects an action profile ã = (ã1, · · · , ãn) ∈ A according to the distribution λ(ht)
and privately informs each player i of his recommended action ãi. Players then simultaneously
choose actions. Finally, the recommendations are revealed to all players, and they become part
2Throughout, subscripts will denote players and superscripts will denote periods. Let |X| denote the cardinality
of X. Also, we parse any vector x ≡ (xi, x−i). Since we consider finite action and signal sets, all functions thereon
are measurable.
3This can equivalently be justified by the Revelation Principle. In our finite model, the Revelation Principle holds
since there cannot be issues with the measurable composition of functions.
4The notion of an extensive form correlation device is attributable to Forges (1986), who provided the canonical
representation and geometric properties of extensive form correlation devices.
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of the next history ht+1. Finally, let Gλ(δ) be the infinitely repeated mediated game with stage
game G, extensive form correlation device λ ∈ Λ, and discount factor 0 < δ < 1.
A (behavior) strategy si for player i is a sequence (sti)∞t=1, where sti : Hti ×Ai → ∆(Ai) for every
period t = 1, 2, . . . So a strategy assigns a mixed action to every pair of history and recommendation.
For any strategy profile (s1, . . . , sn) = s ∈ S = ∏i∈N Si, correlation device λ, and history ht, the









A strategy profile s is a sequential equilibrium ofGλ(δ) if in every period t, history ht, and alternative
strategy s̃i, vti(s|ht, λ) ≥ vti (̃si, s−i|ht, λ)
1.4 Markov Perfect Correlated Equilibrium
If s ∈ S is a sequential equilibrium strategy profile of Gλ(δ), then Prokopovych (2006) calls the
pair (s, λ) a Perfect Correlated Equilibrium (PCE) of G(δ). The correlation device assumed in a
PCE may depend arbitrarily on history. We now introduce a simpler solution concept that yields
the same payoff prediction. A correlation device λ is Markovian if its recommendations depend
solely on the outcome (a, ã) of the most recent period. Denote by ΛM the space of all such devices
λ : A2 → ∆(A). Similarly, a strategy s is Markovian if it depends only on the most recent outcome
and currently recommended action ãi, i.e. si : A2 × Ai. If the device λ is Markovian, then there
is a Markovian best response to a Markovian strategy (cf. Hernandez-Lerma, 1989 Theorem 2.2).
Thus, a pair (s, λ) is a Markov Perfect Correlated Equilibrium (MPCE) of G(δ) if it is a PCE of
G(δ) and both the correlation device λ and the strategy profile s are Markovian.
Let V λ be the set of all sequential equilibrium payoff vectors of Gλ(δ). The MPCE payoff set





The Appendix exploits self-generation methods to prove:
Lemma I.1. Any PCE payoff is attainable in an MPCE.
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Because every MPCE is a PCE by definition, Lemma I.1 implies that both concepts yield the same
equilibrium payoff sets.
Let µ ∈ ∆(A) be a probability distribution on the set of action profiles A— as realized in a PCE
as µ = λ(ht), or in an MPCE as µ = λ(a, ã). Fix a compact convex set of payoff vectorsW ⊂ Rn. A
continuation value function k : A2 →W describes discounted future (equilibrium) payoffs for each
current period outcome. Given the stage game payoffs, the mapping k completely describes the
auxiliary game Gk. This game is (the agent normal form of) a one-shot Bayesian game whose type
profile (ã1, . . . , ãn) ∈ A is drawn from the distribution µ. Each player’s type ãi has the action set Ai,
but the revised payoff function Eµ [(1 − δ)ui(a) + δki(a, ã)|ãi] for the recommended action ãi.
If the distribution µ is a correlated equilibrium of Gk, then the pair (µ, k) is admissible w.r.t.
W , where W is the co-domain of k. In this case,
Eµ[(1− δ)ui(a) + δki(a, ã)|ãi] ≥ Eµ[(1− δ)ui(a′i, a−i) + δki(a′i, a−i, ã)|ãi] (1.1)
for all players i, actions a′i ∈ Ai, and recommendations ãi ∈ Ai and ã ∈ A. The value w of a
pair (µ, k) is the (ex-ante) expected payoff Eµ[(1 − δ)u(a) + δk(a, a)]. Inversely, we write that the
admissible pair (µ, k) enforces the payoff w on the set W if w is the value of the pair, and W is the
co-domain of k.
Let the set B(W ) be the union of all payoffs enforced on W , so that
B(W ) =
{
v = Eµ[(1− δ)π(a) + δk(a, ã)] ∣∣(µ, k) is admissible w.r.t. W}
Equivalently, B(W ) is the union of all correlated equilibrium payoffs in the auxiliary game Gk, ask ranges over all continuation value functions with co-domain W .
The operator B(·) has some convenient properties. First, it is monotone: If W ⊆ W ′, then
B(W ) ⊆ B(W ′). Intuitively, the right side consists of the correlated equilibria of a larger set of
auxiliary games. Secondly, B(·) is convex-valued: If (µ1, k1) supports w1 and (µ2, k2) supports w2,
then for all weights θ ∈ [0, 1], the payoff θw1 + (1 − θ)w2 is supported by (θµ1 + (1 − θ)µ2, θk1 +
(1− θ)k2).
As usual, we call a set W ⊂ Rn is self-generating if W ⊆ B(W ).
Theorem I.1 (MPCE Payoffs). The MPCE payoff set V ∗ has the properties:
(a) It is the largest fixed point of B(·).
(b) It is a compact convex subset of V .
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(c) It contains the convex hull of the set of SPE payoffs of G(δ)
(d) It is nondecreasing in δ.
The proof is in the Appendix, but here we offer some intuition. First, part (a) captures the recursive
structure of MPCE, which is analogous to factorization of PPE. If a set W is self-generating, then
there exists an admissible pair with co-domain W . For any w ∈ W , a sequential equilibrium with
payoff w can be constructed period-by-period by replacing every continuation value with a pair
admissible w.r.t. W . This is always possible since W is self-generating.
Next, compactness in (b) follows since weak inequalities define incentive compatibility. Public
randomization can always be created using a correlation device, and so the MPCE payoff set is
convex. To publicly randomize between outcomes, let us step outside the space of direct devices
and consider a new device that generates two messages for each player: the original message and a
second that indicates the outcome of the public randomization. By the Revelation Principle, there
exists an equivalent direct device.
For insight into part (c), consider the extensive form correlation device that recommends the
subgame perfect equilibrium behavior after every history. By construction, this device constitutes
a PCE, and Lemma I.1 guarantees that this payoff is attainable in an MPCE. Part (c) in particular
implies that the folk theorem holds for MPCE.
Part (d) follows from the well-known principle that dynamic incentives can induce any behavior
in patient players that it can in their less patient counterparts.
The MPCE payoff set can be obtained by iterating the B operator on a seed set W 0 ⊆ Rn
containing the feasible and individually rational payoffs V . The algorithm starts by observing that
V ∗ ⊆ V ⊆ W 0. Then either W 0 is self-generating or B(W 0) ⊆ W 0. Repeatedly applying B(·) to
the inequality V ∗ ⊆W k, where W k = B(W k−1), produces a strictly decreasing sequence of nested
sets that converges to the MPCE set V ∗.
Theorem I.2 (Algorithm). The MPCE payoff set is V ∗ = limj→∞W
j, where the payoff set W 0
obeys V ∗ ⊆W 0, and W j+1 = B(W j) for j = 1, 2, 3, . . .
To implement the algorithm, we employ methods similar to those introduced by Judd, Yeltekin,
and Conklin (2003). Compactness and convexity allow us to represent a set by its extreme points,
and they imply that B(W ) = B(ext W ). This makes the algorithm computationally tractable. The
white area is the SPE payoff set; MPCE payoffs also include the grey area, so that these are MPCE
payoffs unattainable in an SPE; the black area represents feasible and individually rational payoffs







Figure 1.2: Payoffs in the Repeated Game in Figure 1.1.
Let’s return to the repeated game of Section 1.2. In Figure 1.2, one can see that the MPCE
payoff set is significantly larger than that of subgame perfect equilibrium. The extreme feasible
and individually rational payoffs (132/17, 0) and (0, 132/17) are also the highest single player payoff
vectors. So by convexity, the symmetric payoff (66/17, 66/17) is also an MPCE, and in fact the
highest symmetric MPCE payoff. This payoff is a convex combination of two extremal MPCE
payoffs.
We now justify these claims. First, let us construct the device that delivers the highest payoff
to one player. Let (p, q, r, 1− p− q − r) ∈ ∆(A) be the chances of {(C,D), (C,D), (C,D), (C,D)},
respectively, and w1, w2 ∈ R2 the continuation payoffs for players 1, 2. Given the stage game of
Figure 1.1, the highest MPCE payoff for player 1 solves
max
p,q,r,(w1,w2)∈V
(1− δ)(4p− 13q + 20r) + δw1
given: (i) p, q, r ≥ 0 and p+ q + r ≤ 1, and (ii) payoffs are feasible and individually rational, and
in particular 0 ≤ w1, w2 ≤ 132/17, and (iii) two self-generation feasibility constraints that players
not be promised payoffs higher than can be delivered:
w1 ≤ (1− δ)(4p− 13q + 20r) + δw1 and w2 ≤ (1− δ)(4p+ 20q − 13r) + δw2
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and (iv) two incentive constraints, for when players are told to play C:
(1− δ)(4p− 13q) + δw1 ≥ (1− δ)20p and (1− δ)(4p− 13r) + δw2 ≥ (1− δ)20r
Solving this program yields
132/17 = w1 = 4p− 13q + 20r and 0 = 4p+ 20q − 13r and p+ q + r = 1
So (p, q, r) = (13/17, 0, 4/17). Then the payoff (132/17, 0) is attainable in an MPCE. By symmetry,
so too is the payoff (0, 132/17). By convexity, the payoff (66/17, 66/17) is an MPCE.
One can verify that imposing symmetry of the form q = r yields a lower constrained maximum—
i.e. a symmetric device does not yield the highest symmetric payoff. This implies that (66/17, 66/17)
is the highest symmetric MPCE payoff.
This effect is not limited to this example. In fact, a sufficient condition for correlation to be
helpful in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma is that: (i) mutual cooperation is efficient but
not a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, and (ii) the gain to defecting is higher when the other
player cooperates than when he defects.
1.5 Repeated Games of Private Monitoring
A. The Stage Game. The structure here is standard, following closely the set-up of Ely,
Horner, and Olszewski (2005). As in Section 1.3, a repeated game is played in periods 1, 2, . . . Each
period, every player i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n} chooses an action ai from a finite action set Ai. But now,
after play any period, each player receives a private message mi from a finite set Mi. A monitoring
structure ψ is a collection of |A| probability distributions {ψ(·|a) ∈ ∆(M) | a ∈ A} on the message
profile set M =
∏
iMi. Let the set of all monitoring structures be Ψ. After an action profile a is
realized, a message profile m = (m1, . . . ,mn) is drawn with chance ψ(m|a), and each player i is
then privately informed of his component message mi.
A player’s realized payoff πi(ai,mi) following action ai and message mi depends on the other
actions only through their effect on the private messages. In other words, observing one’s payoff






We shall consider different monitoring structures ψ consistent with the same “expected stage
game”. This requires that the payoffs u(a) = (u1(a), . . . , un(a)) not depend on the monitoring
structure. Since payoffs depend on ψ in (1.2), this exercise implies a corresponding change in the
stochastic payoff structure π. Such a choice is possible provided (1.2) is solvable in πi for any ψi,
and for all players i. This is feasible if and only if the matrix (ψi(mi|ai, a−i),mi ∈Mi, a−i ∈ A−i)
has full rank for every player i, and every action ai. This requires that each player can statistically
identify the actions of his opponents.5 This generically holds when, for instance, everyone has at
least as many messages as there are players. We assume that this condition is met by any monitoring
structure in Ψ under consideration. Our results do not explicitly depend on this; it simply allows
us to meaningfully consider a fixed stage game.
B. The Repeated Game. Let Gψ(δ) denote the infinitely repeated game of private monitoring
with monitoring structure ψ, played in periods t = 1, 2, 3, . . . . Payoffs are discounted as usual by
the factor 0 < δ < 1. The game reduces to a standard repeated game with perfect monitoring when
private messages are action profiles, i.e. if Mi = A and ψi(mi|a) = 1 when mi = a and 0 otherwise,
for all players i. Similarly, the game reduces to a standard repeated game with public monitoring if
Mi =M for all players i, and ψi(m|a) = 1 if and only if ψj(m|a) = 1 for every pair of players i, j.
In each period, a player observes his realized action ai ∈ Ai and private message mi. Let the
null history h1i be player i’s history before play begins. A private history h
t
i is the complete record
of player i’s past actions (a1i , . . . , a
t−1
i ) and past private messages (m
1
i , . . . ,m
t−1
i ), including the
null history. Let Hti be the set of all possible private histories h
t





set of all such histories of any length. A (behavior) strategy si is a sequence of functions {sti}
∞
t=1,
where sti : H
t
i → ∆(Ai) for every period t = 1, 2, 3, . . . In other words, it maps every private into a
mixed action. Let S be the space of all such strategy profiles s = (s1, . . . , sn).
Given the strategy profile s ∈ S, Bayes’ rule and the Law of Total Probability naturally imply
beliefs and behavior at all future information sets. Let vi : S → R be the discounted average
payoff for player i in the repeated game Gψ(δ). While more precisely presented in the Appendix,
here we write that player i’s discounted average payoff starting in period t from the strategy
profile s is vti(s|h
t
i). Then a strategy profile s is a sequential equilibrium of Gψ(δ) if and only
if no player can ever profitably deviate, i.e. vi(s|hti) ≥ vi(s̃i, s−i|h
t
i) for every private history h
t
i
and strategy s̃i : Hi → ∆(Ai) of every player i. Since playing a Nash equilibrium of G after
every history is a sequential equilibrium, existence is guaranteed. Let Vψ be the set of sequential
5This is somewhat analogous to the pairwise full rank condition of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994), which
requires that each player be able to statistically identify the actions of another player.
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equilibrium payoff vectors of the mediated game Gψ(δ).
1.6 Unattainable Private Monitoring Payoffs
A. An Upper Bound. We bound the sequential equilibrium payoffs by the MPCE payoff set V ∗.
This inclusion might at first blush appear surprising: For the repeated game Gψ(δ) has no proper
subgames, whereas Gλ(δ) introduces a new subgame every period. So while continuation play in
Gλ(δ) is common knowledge, it is not so in Gψ(δ). We proceed by associating outcomes in Gψ(δ)
with those of Gλ(δ). To do so, we replace the endogenous correlated beliefs in Gψ(δ) with those
from a fixed correlation device λ. Also, we do so in an incentive compatible fashion.
Theorem I.3 (Upper Bound). For any monitoring structure ψ, every sequential equilibrium payoff
of the repeated game Gψ(δ) is attained in an MPCE of G(δ).
This implies that MPCE captures the payoffs in many studied subclasses of equilibria. It contains
all PPE payoffs for any public monitoring structure, as well as all sequential equilibrium payoffs
in private strategies (Kandori and Obara, 2006), as well as all belief-free and weakly-belief-free
equilibrium payoffs (Kandori, 2008).
The proof in the Appendix first deduces this result for PCE, and then appeals to Lemma I.1.
The proof for PCE involves two steps. We show that for any strategy profile s ∈ S, there exists a
correlation device λ ∈ Λ and strategy profile s ∈ S that induce in Gλ(δ) the same outcome as does s
in Gψ(δ). After the history ht in the mediated game Gλ(δ), the correlation device draws a “fictitious
private history” hti for each player i ∈ N according to the true posterior probability of that history
conditional on the actions of history ht. The device then recommends the actions prescribed at
that private history profile ht by the continuation strategy profile s(ht). By induction on the
period t, we show that the distribution over recommendations in the mediated game coincides with
the distribution of actions in Gψ(δ). In our next step, we argue that if s is a sequential equilibrium
strategy profile of Gψ(δ), then λ constitutes a PCE. For if some player has a profitable deviation in
Gλ(δ), then we argue that he must also have one in Gψ(δ). The argument turns on the equivalence
of beliefs about continuation play in Gλ(δ) and Gψ(δ).
B. A Tight Upper Bound. Since this upper bound is independent of the monitoring structure ψ,
one might think that the inclusion in Theorem I.3 could not be tight. In fact, this is true, but only
because correlated play in a private monitoring game starts no earlier than the second period. So
inspired, we now exploit the MPCE payoffs to deduce a tight upper bound for equilibrium payoffs
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of private monitoring games.
For a standard repeated game played in periods 1, 2, 3, . . ., we can remove the first period
correlation from MPCE. An admissible pair (µ, k) is called Nash admissible if µ is the result of
independent mixtures, i.e. µ ∈
∏




v = Eµ[(1 − δ)π(a) + δk(a, ã)] ∣∣(µ, k) is Nash admissible w.r.t. W}
This collects the Nash equilibrium payoffs of all auxiliary games formed with continuation value
functions mapping into W . Since first period strategies are uncorrelated in Gψ(δ), we use a two-
stage procedure. First, we compute the MPCE payoff set, and then use this set W = V ∗ as
continuation payoffs in BNE(W ).
Theorem I.4 (Tightness). A payoff is Nash admissible w.r.t. the MPCE set of G(δ) if and only if





Without reference to the monitoring structure, there exists no tighter bound on the sequential
equilibrium payoffs in a repeated game of private monitoring.
In the example of Section 1.2, Theorem I.3 demonstrates that (66/17, 66/17) is the highest sym-
metric sequential equilibrium payoff in the infinitely repeated game with any monitoring structure,
and so all symmetric payoffs in (66/17, 4] are unattainable. In fact, except for the payoffs (132/17, 0)
and (0, 132/17), all efficient payoff vectors are unattainable in a sequential equilibrium.
C. How Restrictive Is Perfect Public Equilibrium? We are now in a place to discuss what
is lost by restricting attention to public monitoring. Since the set of PPE payoffs is a subset of
subgame perfect payoffs, the demonstrated gap between the MPCE and SPE payoff sets implies
that a public solution concept may fail to capture the potential outcomes of environments with
richer information in which the folk theorem is silent. Thus a regulator attempting to detect
antitrust violations may, upon observing payoffs inconsistent with some PPE, draw the wrong
conclusion about collusion. These efforts ought to keep in mind the strategic opportunities afforded
by complex information structures; This is done precisely by using MPCE in the place of a public
monitoring solution concept. Furthermore, in many applications the relevant monitoring structure
is difficult to determine, and thus PPE is difficult to use. Thus unlike PPE, MPCE enables one to
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study equilibrium payoffs while being agnostic about the monitoring structure.
We will now demonstrate that for a generic class of prisoner’s dilemma games, if the discount
factor is high, but not too high, correlation improves upon subgame perfect equilibrium, and hence
perfect public equilibrium. Consider the infinite repetition of the following prisoner’s dilemma,




Figure 1.3: Prisoner’s Dilemma (b > 1, c > 0)
As before, we assume that (C,C) is the efficient action profile (i.e. b− c < 2), and that the gain
to defecting when the opponent plays C is larger than the gain when he plays D (i.e. b − 1 < c).
Stahl (1991) characterizes the subgame perfect equilibrium payoff correspondence with respect to
the discount factor. If δ < c
b
then the only repeated game payoff vector is the stage game Nash
equilibrium payoff (0, 0). When δ ≥ b−1
b
, every feasible and individually rational payoff vector is a




) then the set of subgame perfect
payoffs is the triangle T = {(0, 0), (b− c, 0), (0, b− c)}.
When the discount factor is in this intermediate range, correlation can be used to support a






























(v∗, v∗) if a = ã = (C,C)
(b− c, 0) if a = ã = (D,C)
(0, b− c) if a = ã = (C,D)
(0, 0) if a = ã = (D,D)
(0, 0) if a 6= ã
We can then check whether the auxiliary game implied by this continuation value function takes the
form of “chicken”, and therefore has non-trivial correlated equilibria. For the game to be “chicken”
it must be that
(1− δ) + δv∗ ≤ (1− δ)b
(1− δ)(−c) + δ(b − c) ≥ 0




Understanding the equilibria of repeated games with private monitoring has long been the next
frontier in game theory. Yet finding sequential equilibria here has been hard, because existing recur-
sive methods only capture subsets of them. In this paper, we have developed a new solution concept
for repeated games, Markov Perfect Correlated Equilibrium, with a recursively computable payoff
set. This is the smallest set that contains all equilibrium payoffs of the analogous repeated game
endowed with any monitoring structure. It therefore provides insights into important economic
environments while being agnostic about specific, possibly unobservable, informational aspects of
the game. We also hope our bound will offer a rebirth to the recursive methods of Abreu, Pearce,




In his classic 1953 paper, Blackwell compares two partial orderings on experiments, or informa-
tive signals. The first ranks experiments by statistical sufficiency — experiment A is sufficient for
B if B is a statistical garbling of A, or intuitively, B can be attained by adding noise to A. The
second ranks experiments by their economic value in decision problems with state-dependent pay-
offs. Experiment A is more valuable than B if the decision maker can attain a larger set of payoffs
with A than with B in any decision problem. Blackwell showed that experiment A is sufficient for
B if and only if it is more valuable.
In this paper, we ask the Blackwell equivalence question in a strategic setting. In other words,
does there exist a partial order on information held by players in a game that reflects “more” or
“better” information, which coincides precisely with the ability to induce more equilibrium payoff
vectors in all Bayesian games? If so, we say that it is “strategically more valuable”. In this
paper, we define a meaningful sense in which information structures can be compared by how
“strategically informative” they are. Combining the two notions, we answer our original question
in the affirmative: There exists an intuitive definition and characterization of the partial order
more strategically informative, and it is equivalent to the partial order more strategically valuable.
The conditions we provide are easily checked, are useful in an array of economic settings, and have
straightforward geometric interpretations.
Our main theorem applies to a wide variety of economic environments of interest endowed with
commonly used information structures. For example, sunspots are a frequently used tool in general
equilibrium theory. Our results provide a natural partial ordering on sunspot equilibria, regardless
of the environment in which they operate. The centerpiece application is to repeated games with
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private monitoring. In a repeated game with private monitoring, each period players simultaneously
choose actions, after which each player privately observes a signal informative of the action profile
most recently played. Neither the actions nor signal realizations are ever observed by any other
player. The more strategically informative order ranks monitoring structures — the probability
distribution on private signals — in much the same way. Consequently, we can show when a change
in monitoring structure will weakly expand the set of sequential equilibria. This mirrors a classic
result of Kandori (1992) for repeated games with imperfect public monitoring.
The most closely related paper to this one is that by Gossner (2000). He studies the same
question, and succeeds in obtaining a different characterization. We feel that the current approach is
superior in several dimensions. First, our condition is easier to verify — it corresponds geometrically
to well understood statistical concepts. Second, while the proofs in Gossner (2000) are indirect and
complex, we provide a straightforward, illuminating proof that leverages the separation argument
at the core of Blackwell’s Theorem.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 The Informational Setting
We begin with the “extrinsic uncertainty” of our environment, the probability space P =
(Ω,F , µ). The set Ω represents the sample space, i.e. all possible states of the world. Measur-
able events are described by F , a σ-algebra of Ω. Finally, µ is a (prior) measure on the events of
F .
The environment is populated with n ≥ 2 players. Each player’s private information is described
by a (possibly infinite) partition Pi of Ω, a mutually exclusive and exhaustive family of subsets
of Ω measurable with respect to F . At a state ω ∈ Ω the set pi(ω) ∈ Pi is the set of states
indistinguishable by player i, which we will call a cell. Similarly, let P = {Pi}ni=1 be the joint
partition of all players.
An information structure I is a pair (P, {Pi}ni=1) of a probability space P and a joint parti-
tion P = {Pi}
n
i=1. Assuming that the relevant probability space is Ω = [0, 1] endowed with the
Borel σ-algebra and the Lebesgue measure entails no loss of generality, so in much of what follows
we do so. In that case, an information structure is completely described by the joint partition P .
Consider the following two player information structures:
P1 = {[0, 1/3), [1/3, 1]} P2 = {[0, 2/3), [2/3, 1]}
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0 11/3 2/3
Figure 2.1: Information Structure P
0 11/3 2/3
Figure 2.2: Information Structure Q
and
Q1 = {[0, 2/3), [2/3, 1]} Q2 = {[0, 1/3), [1/3, 1]}
The information structure Q is obtained from P by ‘relabeling’, in this case reversing the direction
of the interval [0, 1]. Since the state is not payoff relevant, it is natural to require that these
information structures have equivalent strategic effects in any environment. In fact, by the same
logic any (measure preserving) permutation of the state space should be similarly inconsequential
and for the purposes of this paper be treated as equivalent. Let [P ] be the set of information
structures equivalent to P : Q ∈ [P ] if there exists a transformation t in the permutation group T (Ω)
such that P = t(Q).1 We can then define the equivalence relation ∼: P ∼ Q if and only if Q ∈ [P ].
This relation is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. In what follows, we will work on the quotient
space of information structures modulo ∼, defined by the canonical projection from the space of
all information structures to the quotient space. Therefore, without loss of generality, we will not
distinguish between elements of an equivalence class.
Let σ(Pi) be the σ-algebra generated by Pi, and σ(P) the σ-algebra generated by P on the
product space ×ni=1Ω. Information structure P refines Q if σ(Qi) ⊆ σ(Pi) for every player i. Two
sub-σ-algebras F ,G are conditionally independent given σ-algebra H — written (F ⊥ G)|H — if
any two events F ∈ F and G ∈ G are conditionally independent given H, namely:
µ(F ∩G|H) = µ(F |H)µ(G|H)
Information structure P is more strategically informative than Q — written P ≫ Q — if P
refines Q and (Pi ⊥ Q−i)|Qi for every player i . This requires that the information added by
P (relative to Q) be safely ignored by any player: if players −i ignore the added information,
nothing is lost by player i by doing so as well. Conditional independence means that player i’s
1A permutation group (of transformations) T is a set of measure preserving bijective automorphisms on a set X
such that: (a) If t1 ∈ T and t2 ∈ T , then t1 ◦ t2 ∈ T ; (b) For all transformations t ∈ T there exists t−1 ∈ T such
that for all elements x ∈ Xwe have (t−1 ◦ t)(x) = x, i.e. there exists an inverse; and (c) There exists e ∈ T such that
e(x) = x, i.e. there exists an identity.
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Figure 2.3: Sunpot with Two Ouctomes
0 11/4 1/2 3/4
Figure 2.4: Sunspot with Four Outcomes
Consider the two-player information structures depicted in Figures 2.3 and 2.4:
P1 = P2 = {[0, 1/2), [1/2, 1]}
and
Q1 = Q2 = {[0, 1/4), [1/4, 1/2), [1/2, 3/4), [3/4, 1]}
In this example, P is a sunspot with two outcomes and Q is a sunspot with four outcomes. P is
strategically more informative than Q. 
Example 2
0 11/2
Figure 2.5: Information Structure P
0 11/3 2/3
Figure 2.6: Information Structure Q
0 11/6 1/3 1/2 2/3 5/6
Figure 2.7: Information Structure R is constructed by embedding Q in both halves of P
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Now, consider the following three information structures, each for two players:
P1 = P2 = {[0, 1/2), [1/2, 1]}
Q1 = {[0, 1/3), [1/3, 1]} Q2 = {[0, 2/3), [2/3, 1]}
R1 = {[0, 1/6), [1/6, 1/2), [1/2, 2/3), [2/3, 1]} R2 = {[0, 1/3), [1/3, 1/2), [1/2, 5/6), [5/6, 1]}
In this example, P is again a sunspot with two outcomes. The information structure Q is the signal
used in Aumann’s original paper on correlated equilibrium Aumann (1974). Neither P ≫ Q nor
Q ≫ P . However, R ≫ P and R ≫ Q.
2.2.2 Formulation as Signals
Example 3: Bivariate Gaussian Signals
Suppose there are two players who each observe a signal generated by a bivariate normal distribution
with variance normalized to 1 and covariance ρ. With a slight abuse of notation, let Pρ refer to
the information structure induced by bivariate Gaussian signals with covariance ρ. Any correlation
is more strategically informative than independent signals, that is if ρ 6= 0 we have Qρ ≫ Q0,
where 0 denotes independence. It should also be clear that by a simple transformation Qρ and
Q−ρ are equally strategically informative. However, for distinct non-zero covariances p, q inducing
information structures P and Q, respectively, neither P ≫ Q nor Q ≫ P .
Example 4: Multivariate Gaussian Signals
When the information structure is composed of normally distributed signals, even when there are
n players, the more strategically informative ordering has a particularly convenient representation.
Suppose there is a vector valued random variable X ∼ N(0,ΣX), where ΣX is an n × n positive
semi-definite (covariance) matrix. Then the state space Ω = Rn. Each of n players is informed of
the projection of X onto Ωi, i.e. the i-th component Xi of X .
Suppose the random variable Y ∼ N(0,ΣY ). Let ΣXY be the covariance matrix for the random
variable [X,Y ]. Let Mi be an (n+1)× (n+1) matrix obtained by eliminating rows and columns 1
to i−1 and i+1 to n. Mi is the covariance matrix for player i’s information under X and all players
information under Y . By a known characterization of conditional independence for multivariate
Gaussian distributions, we have the following result. The random variable X is more strategically
informative than Y if and only if Mi is singular for every player i.
Application: Repeated sampling So far we have considered a setting in which each agent
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observes his component of one signal. In many interesting economic environments agents observe
multiple signals. Therefore, we extend our results to repeated signals, showing they are more
strategically valuable.
Suppose instead of observing a realization of one signal, each player observes K > 1 signals.
Now, nature chooses a vector (ω1, . . . , ωK) corresponding to the realization of K independent
random variables. For each random variable k ≤ K there is a probability space Pk = (Ωk,Fk, µk).




exclusive and exhaustive family of subsets of
∏
k Ω




k. Since for j 6= k we have F j ⊥ Fk, it is clear that more signals increases strategic
information.
2.2.3 The Strategic Environment
We now turn to the strategic aspects of these environments. An n-player game G in normal
form is a set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a set Ai of pure actions available to each player i, and
a function g from the set of action profiles A =
∏
i(Ai) into Rn. Let Γn be the set of all n-player
games in normal form. A game G ∈ Γn extended by P allows each player to choose his action
conditional on the cell of his partition in which he finds himself. Therefore, a strategy is now a
function fi from Pi to Ai, where fi(pi) is the action played by player i in cell pi. The expected
payoff function E[g(f(p)|P)] is evaluated in the obvious way by using Bayes rule.




for all players i and all strategies f ′i . If f is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, then E[g(f(p)|P)] is a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium payoff. Let Π(G|P) be all Bayes-Nash equilibrium payoffs in the game G
extended by information structure P .
An information structure P is more strategically valuable than information structure Q — writ-
ten P ⊒ Q — if Π(G|P) ⊇ Π(G|Q) for all games G ∈ Γn.
2.3 The Equivalence Result
We are now in a position to state the main result of this paper, which we prove in the appendix.
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Theorem II.1. Information structure P is more strategically valuable than information structureQ
if and only if P is more strategically informative than Q:
P ⊒ Q ⇔ P ≫ Q
We now return to our previous example to demonstrate the implications of Theorem II.1. As we
showed, neither P nor Q is more strategically informative than the other. Theorem II.1 implies that
they are also not ranked by the more strategically valuable relation. To see this, we will demonstrate
a game in which information structure P induces an equilibrium payoff not attained with Q, and
vice versa. In the coordination game depicted in Figure 2.8, the signal provided by P generates
the payoff (3/2, 3/2). This payoff requires perfect coordination and so cannot be obtained with
Q. Similarly, the information structure Q induces the payoff (10/3, 10/3) in the game of chicken,








Figure 2.9: Game of Chicken
2.4 Economic Applications
2.4.1 Application to Repeated Games
Kandori (1992) shows that in a repeated game with imperfect public monitoring, the equilibrium
payoff set expands in the accuracy of the public signal. Our result extends this line of thought
to repeated games with private monitoring. In particular, we show that the set of sequential
equilibrium payoffs grows when the monitoring structure becomes more strategically informative.
A repeated game is played in periods 1, 2, . . . Each period, each player i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
chooses an action ai from a finite action set Ai. Players do not observe the actions of others,
instead observing private signals of the period’s outcome. After play any period, each player
receives a private message mi from a finite set Mi. A monitoring structure ψ is a collection
of |A| probability distributions {ψ(·|a) ∈ ∆(M) | a ∈ A} on the message profile set M =
∏
iMi.
Let the set of all monitoring structures be Ψ. After an action profile a is realized, a message
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profile m = (m1, . . . ,mn) is drawn with chance ψ(m|a), and each player i is then privately informed
of his component message mi.
A monitoring space is a collection of |A| probability spaces {P(a)}a∈A, and a joint partition
of the sample space for each action profile. The more common notion of a monitoring structure
consisting of a set of messages for each player and a probability distribution over message profiles
for each action profile is clearly a special case of a monitoring space. For consistency with the
literature, let each player’s message space be his partition of the sample space and let the set of
message profiles be the meet of all players’ partitions.
In each period, a player knows his realized action ai ∈ Ai and observes his private message mi.
Let the null history h1i be player i’s history before play begins. A private history h
t
i is the complete
record of player i’s past actions (a1i , . . . , a
t−1
i ) and past private messages (m
1
i , . . . ,m
t−1
i ), including
the null history. Let Hti be the set of all possible private histories h
t





the set of all such histories of any length. A (behavior) strategy si is a sequence of functions {sti}
∞
t=1,
where sti : H
t
i → ∆(Ai) for every period t = 1, 2, 3, . . . In other words, it maps every private history
into a mixed action. Let S be the space of all such strategy profiles s = (s1, . . . , sn). Given the
strategy profile s ∈ S, Bayes’ rule and the Law of Total Probability naturally imply beliefs and
behavior at all future information sets.
Each length t private history, together with a strategy profile, implies an ex-ante distribution
on the product space At ×M t. Each player, being informed only of his own actions and signals,
entertains a natural partition of At ×M t. For each period t, this information structure is defined
endogenously by the distribution of mixed actions and monitoring signals. Let Φt(ψ, s) be the
(ex-ante expected) information structure in period t under monitoring structure ψ and strategy
profile s. A monitoring structure ψ1 is more strategically informative than ψ2 if
(





for every player i and every action profile a. In a static context, this precisely coincides with the
previous definition.
Lemma II.1. If a monitoring structure ψ1 is more strategically informative than ψ2, then Φt(ψ1, s)
is more strategically informative than Φt(ψ2, s) for any strategy profile s and any period t.
LetGψ(δ) denote the infinitely repeated game of private monitoring with monitoring structure ψ,
played in periods t = 1, 2, 3, . . . . Payoffs are discounted as usual by the factor 0 < δ < 1. Let
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vi : S → R be the discounted average payoff for player i in the repeated game Gψ(δ). While more
precisely presented in the Appendix, here we write that player i’s discounted average payoff starting
in period t from the strategy profile s is vti(s|h
t
i). Then a strategy profile s is a sequential equilibrium
of Gψ(δ) if and only if no player can ever profitably deviate, i.e. vi(s|hti) ≥ vi(s̃i, s−i|h
t
i) for every
private history hti and strategy s̃i : Hi → ∆(Ai) of every player i. Since playing a Nash equilibrium
of G after every history is a sequential equilibrium, existence is guaranteed. Let Vψ be the set of
sequential equilibrium payoff vectors of the repeated game Gψ(δ)
Suppose monitoring structure ψ1 is more strategically valuable than monitoring structure ψ2.
The main theorem implies that the sequential equilibrium repeated game payoff set with ψ1 contains
that of ψ2. An immediate implication of the lemma is the following theorem.
Theorem II.2. If a monitoring structure ψ1 is more strategically informative than ψ2, then Vψ1 ⊇
Vψ2
2.4.2 Sunspots in General Equilibrium
This result has important implications for general equilibrium theory. Since Debreu (1952)
showed that Walrasian settings can be interpreted as games, our result applies to markets as well.
Public signals that are not payoff relevant is often used in these environments to add convexity
to outcomes. These signals, popularly known as sunspots, make goods divisible and help with
equilibrium selection. Consequently, sunspots play a central role in many general equilibrium
models.
We reinterpret competitive markets as games and model sunspots precisely with information
structures. By doing so, the main result of this paper allows us to say with certainty when “better”
public information forces the set of sunspot equilibria to grow. For example, as in Example 1,
adding nested outcomes necessarily makes the set of equilibria (weakly) expand. However, suppose
all agents observe the realization of a Gaussian random variable before acting. In this case the
variance of the random variable is of no consequence; all sunspots with any positive variance are
equally strategically valuable since observations can be transformed by any non-zero scalar.
2.5 Conclusion
At first glance, the main result should extend to games of incomplete information by intro-
ducing the player “Nature”, as in the tradition of Harsanyi. However, doing so requires the same
conditional independence conditions between each player and Nature as between any two players.
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For intuition, consider the following simple example. There are two players {1, 2}, two states of the
world {l, h} and two pure actions for each player {L,H}. The game is zero-sum, with player 1 as
the maximizer. He earns a payoff of 1 when his action matches the state, and zero otherwise. More





When every individual’s effort imposes negative externalities on his competitors, competition
results in excessive aggregate effort. Forming output-sharing groups among the competitors results
in free riding which tends to reduce the aggregate effort. If groups of the right size happen to
form, inefficiency can (in theory) be eliminated. This paper investigates in a controlled laboratory
setting whether agents, given an opportunity to choose the size of their output-sharing groups, will
eliminate or at least reduce the inefficiencies due to negative externalities.
In competitions to exploit common properties, aggregate effort by competing fishermen exceeds
the socially efficient level (Dasgupta and Heal, 1985) —the so-called “tragedy of the commons.”
Similarly, in innovation tournaments, aggregate investment by firms competing to develop the best
innovation exceeds the level that would maximize their aggregate profit (Baye and Hoppe, 2003)—
the so-called “problem of R&D duplication.” Moreover, in sports contests, aggregate investment
by competing teams to identify and cultivate the athletic talent of their players goes beyond the
level that would maximize total earnings (Canes 1974, Dietl, Franck, and Lang 2008 —the so-called
“problem of ruinous competition between clubs.” Henceforth, we will refer to such situations as
the “negative aggregate spillover problem.”
Since the competition among players who impose negative externalities on each other results
in lost profit opportunities, arrangements have evolved to dampen effort incentives.1 A common
arrangement is for competitors to form groups which share revenue or output. Typically, effort
costs are not shared because effort is too costly to monitor. Thus, as the collective work of Nobel
1According to anthropologists, those hunter-gatherers who have survived may have done so because their tradi-




Laureate Elinor Ostrom has documented (among others, Ostrom (1990), Ostrom and Walker (1991),
and Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1994)), extractors of a common property often form groups
which share whatever is extracted by any member of the group2; to avoid wasteful duplication,
researchers often form joint ventures and share the benefits of their discoveries within their group
(Kamien, Muller, and Zang, 1992); finally, to attenuate overinvestments designed to attract fans
(the upgrading of the home stadium, the search for the best coach, and the coddling of players)
college football teams share revenues within their conferences (Brown, 1994).3
Heintzelman, Salant, and Schott (2009) analyze the consequences of output sharing in an en-
vironment with negative externalities and unobservable effort. They consider a game where N
players partition themselves into groups each of which shares output but not costs. They show
that although forming N solo groups (no output sharing) generates too much effort due to negative
externalities and forming one group with N members generates too little effort due to free riding,
socially optimal effort can be achieved (or approximated due to an integer constraint) with output
sharing groups of intermediate size.
Kamien, Muller, and Zang (1992) consider the effects of forming research joint ventures. They
consider the case where every player invests in cost-reducing R&D and no benefits are shared, the
analog of competing groups each with one member. They find that there is too much duplication.
At the other extreme, they consider the case where every member of a research joint venture shares
equally in the cost-reducing discoveries of the joint venture regardless of which member discovered
it, the analog of one group containing all the researchers. They show that there is too little aggregate
effort. They do not discuss the intermediate case, which would be socially optimal, where research
joint ventures of the right size compete against each other.4
The strategic interactions in these models are similar to those in the Cournot model (1838).
Indeed, “excessive” output in the Cournot model could in theory be reduced toward the monopoly
level if competing subsets of players agreed to share within each group their gross revenues. This
occurs at a local level within competing law partnerships and at an international level within ocean
liner conferences which share gross revenues to facilitate cartelization (see Bennathan and Walters
1969).
2In Japan, one hundred forty-seven Japanese fisheries currently engage in output sharing. Platteau and Seki (2000)
interviewed skippers in one such fishery. They concluded that “the desire to avoid the various costs of crowding while
operating in attractive fishing spots appears as the main reason stated by Japanese fishermen for adopting pooling
arrangements.”
3Brown (1994) concludes that “The empirical results confirm the theoretical prediction that revenue sharing
provides a disincentive to build a stronger team, other factors constant—-conferences which share more tend to have
weaker teams. . . ”
4For an alternative characterization of research joint ventures, see D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Salant
and Shaffer (1999).
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Schott, Buckley, Mestelman, and Muller (2007) examine output sharing experimentally by ex-
ogenously dividing subjects into equal-size groups. They demonstrate that exogenous variations in
group size affect subsequent behavior as predicted and that the appropriate exogenous group size
results in socially optimal behavior.
In this paper, we investigate whether, given the opportunity to form equal-sized groups of
different sizes, individuals will choose to form groups of the socially optimal size.5 In addition, we
investigate whether the output-sharing groups selected motivate subjects to invest efficiently. To
do this, we conduct a laboratory experiment where subjects vote on the size of their output-sharing
groups and then play an investment game in the chosen group structure. Finally, we also explore
whether individuals choose the efficient group sizes and invest optimal amounts under different costs
of investment. Establishing how players partition themselves endogenously is important, since, in
the field, subjects will choose how many groups to form. If players turned out always to vote for
a suboptimal number of groups, then our laboratory society would never reach efficiency even if,
as in Schott, Buckley, Mestelman, and Muller (2007), it makes socially optimal choices when the
optimal group structure is exogenously mandated.
In our experiments, individuals grouped into solo groups did overinvest relative to the socially
optimal level. But as the group size increased, subjects invested smaller amounts. When given
the opportunity to choose the size of their groups, most of the subjects voted for the group size
that is socially optimal, and subjects cut the waste associated with the negative aggregate spillover
problem on average by at least two-thirds in three of the cost treatments and by one-half in the
remaining cost treatment. When we varied the opportunity cost of investment/effort, subjects
tended to vote for the group size that became socially optimal given the new circumstance.
However, systematic departures from the theory were also noted. We find that without exception
departures are in the direction of the socially optimal investment. Hence, as elsewhere in the
literature, we find that laboratory behavior is more “cooperative” and “other-regarding” than a
theory based on self-interested behavior would predict (i.e., Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992;
Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1994; Ledyard 1995; Camerer 2003; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher
2005).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our experimental design and procedures.
Section 3 presents our theoretical hypotheses. Section 4 reports our experimental findings and the
results of our hypothesis tests. Section 5 discusses directions for future research and concludes the
5Although ours is the first paper to investigate endogenous output-sharing groups in a setting with negative
externalities, the formation of groups has been investigated in public goods environments (Page, Putterman, and




3.2.1 Design and Procedures
We conducted 25 sessions, each with a different set of 6 participants. Most participants were
undergraduates at [insert university name here]. Subjects earned experimental currency (tokens),
which was converted at the conclusion of the session into US dollars (1 token = 0.01 US dollars). The
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree Fischbacher (2007). Sessions
took approximately one hour and a half.
Each session was divided into six separate parts. Each of the first five parts (Parts I–V) consisted
of a sequence of 5 rounds of decision making. Therefore, each subject went through 25 rounds in
total. One aim of the first four parts was to give subjects experience investing as members of groups
of different sizes. In Part V of the experiment, subjects chose the size of the groups endogenously.
In Part VI, subjects completed a short questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, we randomly
selected one round from each of the first five parts, added up the tokens each subject had earned in
the selected rounds, converted that sum to dollars, added in the $5 show-up fee, and paid everyone.
The average payment in the experiment was approximately $25 per subject.
In the first four parts, subjects were exogenously divided into groups of identical size: one-
member groups, two-member groups, three-member groups, or a six-member group. Subjects were
randomly rematched across groups in every round but played 5 consecutive rounds in each group
size in order to gain experience. In total, there were 20 rounds in the first four parts. In order to
control for order effects, the order of the first four parts was changed across sessions.
At the beginning of each decision round in the first four parts, participants were given 6 exper-
imental tokens and had to decide how many of them (0, 1, . . . , 6) to invest in Project B. Whatever
a subject did not invest in Project B was automatically invested in Project A. Denote xik as the
investment in Project B by agent k in group i. Let Y −ki denote the aggregate investment in Project
B by the other members of group i, X−i denote the aggregate investment in Project B by other
groups, and X denote the total investment in Project B by all 6 participants.
Project A had a fixed return of c tokens per token invested; i.e., the subject’s earnings from
Project A equaled c times his investment in Project A. Therefore, the “opportunity cost” of investing
one additional token in Project B equaled c, the lost earnings from Project A.
The return per token invested in Project B, P (X), was a decreasing linear function of the
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aggregate investment in Project B. Therefore, each token invested in Project B imposed a negative
externality on everyone else–the essence of the negative aggregate spillover problem. For each token
invested in Project B, the return from Project B was given by
P (X) = 200− 5X.
Every member of a given group received an equal share of his or her group’s return from Project
B regardless of his or her own investment in that project. An individual’s earnings from Project B




(200− 5X)(xik + Y
−k
i ).
When there is no output sharing, an individual’s earning is given by Ei = (200− 5X)xi. This
functional form is consistent with the formulation that is found in the common-property literature
Dasgupta and Heal (1985), the innovation-tournament literature (Baye and Hoppe, Theorem 1),
and the sports-contest literature (Dietl et al. 2008, equation 2 with α = γ = 1), among others.6 In
all these seemingly unrelated strategic interactions, the same game has been analyzed repeatedly
in disparate literatures.7
Final earnings in each round (in tokens) were simply the sum of earnings from Project A and
earnings from Project B:
πik = (6− xik)c+
1
m
(200− 5X)(xik + Y
−k
i ).
It can be seen that each individual pays the cost of his or her investment but shares the revenue
equally with the members of his group.
In each of the five rounds of Part V, subjects first voted for one of the four group sizes. Then,
subjects were divided up in groups of the size that won the most votes and played the investment
6The same model also appears in the “rent-seeking” literature (Chung 1996, equation 2). For other literatures
where this model appears, see the excellent book-length survey Konrad (2009).
7In each case, player i chooses effort/investment xi and achieves payoff
xi
xi+X−i
v(xi + X−i) − cxi where v(·),
the reward function, gives the value of the output or prize. When the payoff function of each player is rewritten
as xi(P (xi + X−i) − c), where the strictly decreasing function P (xi + X−i) =
v(xi+X−i)
xi+X−i
, the paternity of this
ubiquitous model becomes apparent: it is the Cournot model (1838) in disguise (with xi reinterpreted as effort
instead of output). In the Cournot model, of course, the negative aggregate spillover problem results in larger
industry output than a monopolist would choose. These literatures all assume that v(·) is strictly concave but differ
in whether this function is single-peaked (as in the Cournot model) or strictly increasing (as in Baye and Hoppe
2003); the qualitative results in these literatures are unaffected by this minor difference in assumption. We chose the
simpler of the two formulations as easier to explain to subjects. We assumed that P (X) decreases linearly, which
implies that v(X) is single-peaked (a parabola).
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game. In cases of a tied vote, the winner was chosen at random.8
In our experimental design, different group sizes are socially optimal under different treatments.
In particular, as the opportunity cost of investing in Project B increases, the optimal group size
decreases. Subjects in a given experimental session faced only one cost parameter and had to make
investment decisions in all five parts of the experiment (25 rounds). A summary of the experimental
design is provided in Table 3.1. As Table 3.1 reflects, the socially optimal group size is different
for each treatment. For example, for opportunity cost c = 20, the optimal size of each group is 3
members (or, equivalently, the optimal number of groups is 2).









1 6 Exogenous Voting 5 30 
20 3 Exogenous Voting 5 30 
55 2 Exogenous Voting 5 30 
100 1 Exogenous Voting 5 30 
 
Prior to the experiment, a test was administered to the subjects to make sure they understood
the payoff consequences of their choices. The computer prevented anyone from beginning the session
until everyone had a perfect score on the test.
During the experiment, subjects could either calculate their payoffs by hand or could utilize
a “Situation Analyzer” provided to facilitate their calculations. A subject could enter his or her
conjecture about (1) the total investment in Project B by others inside his or her group and (2)
the total investment in Project B by subjects outside his or her group. The Situation Analyzer
would then provide a table listing in one row the seven choices for investing in Project B (0, 1, . . . , 6
tokens) and in the other row the total payoff from the two projects that the subject would earn
if his or her two conjectures were accurate. Subjects were free to do such calculations by hand or
to use the Situation Analyzer as often as they wanted before making a decision. The Situation
Analyzer is shown in Figure 3.1.
To help subjects to make a decision, subjects were also reminded of their own investments,
others’ investments in their group, and the total investment, as well as their earnings from previous
8Note that in our experiment, voting is used to select group sizes and not some policy regarding the level of
effort/investment. Voting is found to be useful as a tool for policy selection in common pool resources or public
goods literature (Walker, Gardner, Herr, and Ostrom 2000; Tyran and Feld 2006; Putterman and Kamei 2010 ).
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Figure 3.1: Situation Analyzer for Groups of Two
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After the session, we administered a short questionnaire. We asked subjects the basis of their
investment decisions and the basis of their vote on group size. Responses clearly showed that
subjects understood the experiment. Most of the subjects reported that they tried to maximize
their monetary earnings.
3.3 Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses
Theoretical predictions are based on Heintzelman, Salant, and Schott (2009). Given the size
of each group and the opportunity cost of investing in Project B, every individual simultaneously
invests to maximize his or her own payoff from the two projects. Proposition 3.1 summarizes the
mean investment in Project B in the Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1. For a given opportunity cost (c) and group size (m), mean investment in Project
B is x̄ = 200−cm30+5m .
9
We use this formula to calculate the mean equilibrium investment in Table 3.2 for each of the 16
group size-cost combinations in the various experimental treatments. For any opportunity cost (c),
note that Nash equilibrium investment in Project B decreases with the size of each group and that,
for any group size (m), investment also decreases with the opportunity cost.
Proposition 3.2 summarizes the mean investment in Project B that would maximize the aggre-
gate revenue from the two projects. We refer to this as the “socially efficient investment level” and
denote it x∗. It is simply 1/6 of the aggregate investment that maximizes XP (X) + (36−X)c.
9Total investment within each group is uniquely determined in the equilibrium, but not the investment of indi-
vidual members of a group. Therefore, we focus on the mean investment level. See Heintzelman, Salant, and Schott
(2009) for more details.
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Proposition 3.2. To maximize social surplus, mean investment in Project B must be x∗ = 200−c60 .
This formula is used to calculate the socially efficient levels in the last row of Table 3.2. Note that
as the opportunity cost rises, the socially efficient investment level falls.
Equilibrium investment in Project B exceeds the socially optimal level when no one shares
(one-person groups) and falls short of the socially optimal level when everyone shares (six-person
group). Moreover, as the group size increases from one to six, aggregate investment in Project B
declines monotonically. There is, therefore, a unique real number m (not necessarily an integer)
which induces mean investment in the Nash equilibrium (x̄) to equal socially efficient investment
(x∗). When the integer constraint is respected, one of the six group sizes will generate a larger social
surplus in the Nash equilibrium than any other group size and is predicted to increase efficiency close
to the socially optimal level. We refer to this group size as the “partnership solution” (Heintzelman
et al. (2009)). Note that the partnership solution is a self-enforcing mechanism that requires neither
monitoring of individual behavior nor intervention of the government.
In Table 3.2, in every cost column there is an entry in bold-face. The associated row is the
partnership solution for that particular opportunity cost. The entry in bold is the predicted mean
investment in the partnership solution for that opportunity cost.10
Table 3.2: Predicted Mean Investment in Project B
Group size Cost = 1 Cost = 20 Cost = 55 Cost = 100 
1 5.69 5.14 4.14 2.86
2 4.95 4 2.25 0
3 4.38 3.11 0.78 0 
6 3.23 1.33 0 0 
 
Socially efficient 
level = 3.32 
Socially efficient
level = 3 
Socially efficient 
level = 2.42 
Socially efficient
level = 1.67 
 
Proposition 3.3 follows from the definition of the partnership solution:
Proposition 3.3. For a given opportunity cost (c), every individual strictly prefers the partnership
solution to any other group size.
10In this experiment, subjects faced a discrete action space. Though the theoretical predictions were generated
from a game with continuous actions, the assumption of discrete actions does not change the predictions. More
specifically, suppose agents choose a noninteger investment level x for Project B in the symmetric equilibrium of the
continuous investment game. Then, in the discrete version, there is an equilibrium in which every player chooses the
integer above x or below x, or mixes between the two. As a result, both the actions and the payoffs in the discrete
and continuous versions are very similar.
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The partnership solution is the Condorcet winner, because it would be chosen unanimously if every
subject voted for the group size he most preferred. Of course, as in many voting games, inferior
alternatives can also be supported as Nash equilibria since if everyone expects that everyone else
is voting for the same alternative, then no one can change the outcome by deviating unilalter-
ally. However, these spurious Nash equilibria can be eliminated by iterative elimination of weakly
dominated strategies. The partnership solution would then be predicted to receive the most votes.11
In this paper, we test the following hypotheses as well as the point predictions presented in
Table 3.2:
Hypothesis III.1. For a given opportunity cost (c) of investing in Project B, mean investment in
that project strictly decreases with the size of the groups.
Hypothesis III.2. Mean investment in Project B decreases with the opportunity cost of investing
in that project for a given group size.
Hypothesis III.3. Subjects will “elect efficiency”—they will vote for the group size predicted to
generate the largest social surplus in the Nash equilibrium.
The experimental data and findings are presented in the next section.
3.4 Data Analysis
3.4.1 Exogenous Groups and Investment Decisions
Figure 3.2 shows the average investment corresponding to each opportunity cost parameter in the
first 20 rounds (Parts I–IV). For simplicity, group sizes are presented in the following order: one-
member, two-member, three-member, and six-member groups, although orders were randomized
during the sessions.12 Consistent with the theoretical predictions, contributions decrease with the
group size for any cost level.
Theoretical predictions and the observed mean levels of investment in Project B are provided
in Table 3.3. Theory predicts that the socially optimal group size decreases with cost. Observed
mean investment and predicted investment in Project B are shaded for the theoretically optimal
11We piloted a second voting mechanism which needs no such refinement since its Nash equilibrium is unique: after
each subject had voted in the pilot, one of the six subjects was randomly chosen to be “dictator,” and his or her
vote determined the partnership structure. Since every subject anticipated being chosen as the dictator with positive
probability, each subject should have been motivated to vote for his or her most preferred alternative. However, we
were unable to distinguish behavior under the two voting schemes. Hence, we used the more familiar nondictatorial
scheme for this paper.
12We do not observe any order effects in our data.
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group sizes. Observed mean investment at the optimal group size for each cost is surprisingly close
to the theoretical predictions and the socially optimal level of investment.
We performed some nonparametric tests by using independent observations (one data point per
session). One-sided sign tests confirm that there are no significant differences between the observed
levels of investment and the theoretical predictions at the optimal group sizes (p− values > 0.1).
For nonoptimal group sizes, point predictions do not hold in general (p-values are generally less
than 0.05).13 However, all deviations are toward the socially optimal level.
Result III.1. Theoretical predictions hold at the optimal group sizes. However, there are deviations
from quantitative predictions for other group sizes. When data are not consistent with the predicted
levels, deviations are in the direction of socially optimal level in all cases.
Table 3.4 shows the observed mean payoff for each cost and group size. For cost levels c =
{1, 20, 55} theoretically predicted optimal group size generates the highest level of payoff. Note
that for c = 100 theoretically predicted optimal group size is 1 (no output sharing). However, for
c = 100, higher levels of payoff are achieved with group sizes more than 1. One possible explanation
13The two exceptions are when cost is 20 and group size is six and when cost is 55 and group size is one. In these
cases, investments are not significantly different than the predicted levels.
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Table 3.3: Predicted versus Observed Mean Investment
 c = 1 c = 20 c = 55 c = 100 
Group
size 
Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed 

































investment  = 3.32 
Socially efficient 
investment  = 3
Socially efficient 
investment  = 2.42
Socially efficient 
investment  = 1.67
Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Number of observations = 150 per cell 
 
is that, as Table 3.3 shows, theoretically predicted level of investment is not very close to the socially
efficient level (since it is not possible to divide individuals into noninteger group sizes). Even though
the mean investment with solo groups is not significantly different than predicted, the deviations
we observe in the other group sizes affect the payoffs in an unpredicted way.14
Table 3.4: Predicted versus Observed Mean Payoff




















































payoff  = 336 
Socially efficient 
payoff  = 390
Socially efficient 
payoff  = 505
Socially efficient 
payoff  = 683
Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Number of observations = 150 per cell 
 
For cost levels c = {1, 20, 55}, we test whether the Partnership Solution improves the payoff of
participants relative to the case where there is no output sharing (being solo). By using matched-
pair sign-rank tests, we confirm that the Partnership Solution increases the payoffs. In particular,
we compare the mean payoff levels at the socially optimal group size with the mean payoff levels
at the group size of one. Each individual’s payoff increases with the Partnership Solution and the
difference is significant at the 5% level.
14For group sizes greater than 1, complete free riding is not observed as predicted. This is consistent with behavior
observed in public goods experiments. It has been documented that subjects do not free ride completely (see Ledyard
1995).
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For c = 100, the group size of 1 brings the lowest payoff, even though it was the theoretically
optimal group size (p-values for all pairwise comparisons are 0.04). Output sharing seems to help
individuals even in situations where theoretically it is not the case.
Result III.2. Output sharing improves payoffs when groups are exogenously formed.
We complement nonparametric tests with a regression analysis. We investigate the impact of
different group sizes, costs, the order of presenting group sizes, and rounds on individual investment
decisions by running ordinary least squares estimation with robust standard errors (see Table 3.5).15
Regression results (specification 1) show that for a given cost level, an increase in the group
size decreases the level of investment in Project B. We also see that there is a negative relationship
between the level of investment and the opportunity cost parameter, c. Specifications 2–4 show that
these results continue to hold even when we add control variables or when we include the different
treatments as dummy variables.16 In addition, we see that the order of treatments and experience
do not affect investment decisions.17 In summary, one cannot reject hypotheses III.1 and III.2. Our
results are robust to different estimation methods.18
Result III.3. The data are consistent with the (qualitative) theoretical predictions. For each cost
level, investment decreases with group size. Moreover, investment decreases with cost for a given
group size.
3.4.2 Voting for Group Size: The Plurality Rule
Table 3.6 presents the percentage of votes that each group size received for each cost level. There
are 150 observations for a given level of cost and group size. Except for c = 100, groups frequently
vote for the theoretically predicted optimal group size. Approximately 60% of the votes are socially
optimal for c = {1, 55}, and approximately 40% of the votes are socially optimal for c = 20.
For each cost parameter, we test whether one can reject the null hypothesis that the proportion
of votes is 25% for each group size. For c = {1, 20, 55}, one can strongly reject this null hypothesis
(chi-square goodness of fit test, p − values < 0.01). For c = 100, one cannot reject that the
proportion of votes is 25% for each group size (p − value = 0.10). More important, the highest
15Data are clustered by 20 sessions.
16We find that the coefficient of grsize2 is significantly smaller than the coefficient of grsize3, and the coefficient
of grsize3 is significantly smaller than the coefficient of grsize6 (p− values < 0.01). We find the same result for cost
parameters as well.
17Note that the variable round takes values 1, 2, ...,5.
18For robustness checks, we have also conducted fixed-effect regressions both at the individual and at the session
levels. Group size affects investment negatively for all cost levels. In addition, round seems to have a small but
significantly negative effect for cost levels greater than 1. Results are available upon request.
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1 2 3 4 
  
groupsize –0.42** –0.42** –0.43**  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
cost –0.03** –0.03** –0.03**  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
round  0.00 0.00  
  (0.02) (0.02)  
grsize2    –1.23** 
    (0.12) 
grsize3    –1.74** 
    (0.14) 
grsize6    –2.39** 
    (0.13) 
cost20    –0.86** 
    (0.12) 
cost55    –1.95** 
    (0.11) 
cost100    –2.61** 
    (0.09) 
round2    0.04 
    (0.10) 
round3    –0.03 
    (0.09) 
round4    0.09 
    (0.10) 
round5    –0.00 
    (0.10) 
phase2   –0.10 –0.00 
   (0.17) (0.10) 
phase3   –0.01 0.08 
   (0.18) (0.12) 
phase4   –0.08 0.02 
   (0.23) (0.14) 
     
Constant 5.20** 5.19** 5.25** 5.45** 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.16) 
    
Observations 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 
R-squared 0.384 0.384 0.384 0.431 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 
percentage of votes is for the socially optimal group sizes. In particular, for c = 1, group size 6
received the highest number of votes; for c = 20, group sizes 2 and 3 received the highest number
of votes; and for c = 55, group size 2 received the highest number of votes (proportion tests,
p − values < 0.01). For c = 100, group size 3 received significantly more votes than the socially
optimal level of one (proportion test, p− value = 0.049).
Result III.4. For c = {1, 20, 55}, the highest proportion of votes is received by the corresponding
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Table 3.6: Percentage of Votes in Part V
Group size c = 1 c = 20 c = 55 c = 100 
1 8 12.7 7.3 22 
2 16 39.3 57.3 24.7 
3 16.7 39.3 11.3 33.3 
6 59.3 8.7 24 20 
 
socially optimal group sizes. (This holds weakly for c = 20.)
Result III.4 shows that participants choose to form output-sharing groups for all cost levels. In
addition, we conduct a multinomial logit regression analysis to test whether votes are affected by
cost, previous earnings and experience.19 We construct a new variable, bestgroup, which takes value
1, 2, 3 if a subject earned the most money in Parts I–IV when the group size is 1, 2, 3, respectively,
and takes value 4 if a subject earned the most money when the group size is 6.20 Regressors are
jointly significant at the 0.05 level (Wald chi-square = 74.93, p − value < 0.01). In addition, we
find that both cost and bestgroup significantly affect votes (Wald tests, p − value = 0.03 and
p− value < 0.01 respectively). However, coefficient estimates of round are not jointly statistically
significant (p − value = 0.40). Table 3.7 presents the marginal effects after a multinomial logit
regression. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
Table 3.7: Multinomial Logit Regression – Marginal Effects
 Dependent variable = vote 
VARIABLES Group size = 1 Group size = 2 Group size = 3 Group size = 6 
     
cost 0.001 –0.000 0.001 –0.002*
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
bestgroup –0.037 –0.266** 0.059 0.245** 
 (0.034) (0.052) (0.036) (0.032) 
round 0.007 0.005 –0.023 0.011 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) 
     
Observations 600 600 600 600 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
We see that the probability of voting for group size 6 significantly decreases with cost and
increases with bestgroup, whereas the probability of voting for group size 2 decreases with best-
group.21 These findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions. A simple correlation analysis
19Since utilities from different group sizes do not need to be ordered, a multinomial logit regression analysis is more
suitable than an ordered logit regression analysis. In addition, we have performed OLS regressions, and qualitative
results did not change.
20The earnings in each part are calculated by adding up each payoff from the 5 corresponding rounds.
21Since bestgroup is a discrete variable, we have also looked at the predicted probabilities for each group size under
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also confirms that votes are negatively correlated with cost (–0.21) and positively correlated with
bestgroup (0.46).
Result III.5. Votes are affected by both the cost parameter and the previous earnings at different
group sizes. Votes do not change significantly as subjects get more experienced with voting.
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Table 3.8 presents the voting outcomes, mean investment decisions and payoffs conditional on
the chosen group size.22 As in the exogenous groups, we see that participants choose investment
levels that are consistent with the theoretical predictions at the socially optimal group sizes (all
each possible value of bestgroup. We have observed similar results.
22Since ties are broken randomly, even though there are equal number of votes for group sizes 2 and 3 when cost
is 20, group size 2 won the voting more frequently than group size 3.
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p-values are greater than 0.27).23 Moreover, qualitative results are similar to the case when groups
are exogenously imposed: investment decreases with the group size (p − value < 0.01) and cost
(p− value < 0.01). Regression results are available from the authors.
Result III.6. Mean investment levels in Part V are not significantly different than theoretically
predicted levels at the socially optimal group sizes. In addition, investments are consistent with the
(qualitative) theoretical predictions. Investment decreases with group size and cost.
Finally, we compare the efficiency of endogenous group formation with the case of exogenous
groups. Efficiency of each part is defined by the observed average payoff divided by socially optimal
payoff. In Table 3.9, we provide the efficiency levels in all parts for each cost treatment. As expected,
efficiency levels are quite large. Endogenous group formation increases efficiency compared with
the case of no output sharing for all cost levels. In particular, efficiency loss decreased by 50% for
cost = 100 and by 68% to 71% for the other cost levels.
Table 3.9: A Comparison of Efficiency Levels
 Group size c = 1 c = 20 c = 55 c = 100 
Exogenous 1 0.72 0.76 0.84 0.92 
2 0.85 0.95 0.98 0.98 
3 0.93 0.97 0.92 0.98 
6 0.96 0.87 0.88 0.96 
Endogenous voting 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.96 
 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions
When every individual’s effort imposes negative externalities on his competitors, competition
results in excessive aggregate effort. This explains overfishing when competing on common proper-
ties, excessive proposal polishing in grant competitions, duplication in innovation tournaments, and
excessive talent searches among competing sports teams. In theory, one way to curb these excesses
is for subsets of competitors to form groups which share output or revenue. If the right number of
groups forms, Nash equilibrium aggregate effort should fall to the socially optimal level.
We investigated experimentally whether individuals in fact manage to form the efficient number
of groups and to invest within the chosen groups as theory predicts. We find that output sharing
attenuates the negative aggregate spillover problem independent of the opportunity cost of invest-
ing. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find a negative relationship between the aggregate
23We focus on the socially optimal group size, since votes are more often for the optimal group size. Therefore,
there are not too much data available on the other group sizes. In fact, there are too few data points for many of
the nonoptimal group sizes, which makes statistical testing not very meaningful.
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investment levels (the counterpart to fishing effort, R&D effort, etc.) and group size. For a given
group size, we show that aggregate investment decreases as the opportunity cost of investing in
it increases. More importantly, we show that socially optimal group sizes are the most common
outcome of the endogenous group formation stage under most of the cost parameters.
Regarding the point predictions, we find that partnership solution (exogenous implementation
of socially optimal group size) generates theoretically predicted levels of investment. However, in
general, theory does not predict the magnitudes very well for the nonoptimal group sizes. For
any deviations from equilibrium predictions, we see that investments shift toward the efficient
outcome.24 One explanation for this is that individuals are altruistic. If individuals care not only
for themselves but also for others, then one would expect to see higher levels of efficiency than a
theory predicated on the assumption of self-interested behavior would predict (except when the
theory predicts socially optimal outcomes). This is highly consistent with our experimental data.
Moreover, this type of behavior has been commonly observed in other experimental studies on
common-pool resources and public goods (see Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1994; Ledyard 1995).
Future research should address the stability of the partnership mechanism and its sensitivity to
inter-subject communication. By stability, we mean migrations of subjects among existing groups
or from an existing group to a newly formed group.25 The effect of inter-subject communication on
the Partnership Solution is the subject of a recent study by Buckley, Mestelman, Muller, Schott,
and Zhang (2009). They find that when individuals within the same output-sharing group are
able to communicate, free riding decreases. It is unclear from their work whether similar results
would occur if subjects collectively chose their group size; moreover, communication may affect the
choice of group size itself. We leave the investigation of such interplay between communication and
endogeneity to future research.
24We focus on the exogenous groups since there are very few data points for statistical testing for endogenous
groups at the nonoptimal group sizes.
25After the voting stage but before the investment stage, a migration stage could be inserted. Subjects could be
permitted to migrate simultaneously from the group to which they are assigned after the voting stage to another
group of their choosing. Heintzelman, Salant, and Schott (2009) predict that no such migrations should occur.
However, they also predict that migrations to newly formed solo partnerships would occur unless there was a direct
cost to such migrations or there was a benefit to team production which would be lost by going solo. We plan to
test these predictions in future work.
CHAPTER IV
Omitted Proofs
4.1 Any PCE Payoff is an MPCE Payoff: Proof of Lemma I.1
Let W ⊂ Rn be a compact, convex set with extreme points denoted ext W . The continuation
value function k : A2 → W ⊂ Rn has the bang-bang property if k(a, ã) ∈ ext W for all action
profiles a ∈ A and recommendation profiles ã ∈ A.
We first argue that any continuation value function can be replaced with one that takes values
in ext W .
Claim IV.1 (Bang-Bang). Any continuation value function is equivalent to one with the bang-bang
property.
Proof of Claim IV.1: We adapt the proof of Theorem 3 in APS, accounting for correlation and a
finite domain of the continuation value function.1 For a bounded set W ⊂ Rn, let K(W ) be the set
of all functions from A × A to W , and K(W |w) ⊆ K(W ) the set of continuation value functions
that support w on W . Since K(W ) = W |A|
2
, and W is compact, it is compact in the product
topology, by Tychonov’s Theorem. Next, since a convex combination of admissible pairs is also an
admissible pair , K(W |w) is a convex set. As a closed subset of a compact set, it is compact. By
the Krein-Milman Theorem, any k ∈ K(W |w) can be written as a convex combination of extreme
points of K(W |w). Finally, linearity of incentives and payoffs implies that k̂ is a convex combination
of extreme points of K(ext W |w), and consequently has the bang-bang property. 
Proof of Lemma I.1: Let [x1, . . . , xm] be the convex hull of the points (x1, . . . , xm). Let VPCE be
the set of PCE payoffs. Fix a PCE λ ∈ Λ with payoff w ∈ VPCE . Define the product space V ≡
1In APS, an equilibrium prescribes continuation behavior for each of a continuum of possible public signals. This
required an appeal to Aumann (1965) for technical reasons. In our context, a continuation value function is defined





|A|2 . To prove that the payoff w is attainable in an MPCE, we show that there exists a
correlation device λM ∈ ΛM that delivers the payoff w and is incentive compatible. Thus, we want
to show that the payoff vector w is supported by the convex hull of a self-generating set of |A|2
payoff vectors.
Any continuation value function can be written as an ordered |A|2-tuple of payoff vectors, one
for each action profile and recommendation. Define the correspondence on |A|2-tuples of payoff
vectors φ : V → 2V by
φ(v1, . . . , v|A|2) = [K( VPCE |v1 ), . . . ,K(VPCE |v|A|2 ] )] ∩ [v1, . . . , v|A|2 ]
The correspondence φ maps |A|2-tuples of payoff vectors to the convex hull of supporting sets of
|A|2-tuples of payoff vectors.
We now claim that the correspondence φ satisfies the hypotheses of the Kakutani Fixed Point
Theorem. Since VPCE is non-empty, compact and convex, V is non-empty, compact and convex.
The correspondence has non-empty values: since vj is a PCE payoff, K(VPCE , vj) is not empty.
Since by Claim IV.1 continuation payoffs can equivalently be taken from ext VPCE , the intersection
with the convex hull of an arbitrary set of PCE payoffs is non-empty. Furthermore, φ takes compact
convex values as the intersection of two compact, convex sets. By Claim IV.1 and the Theorem of
the Maximum, K(VPCE , vj) is upper hemi-continuous in vj . Similarly, [v1, . . . , v|A|2 ] is upper hemi-
continuous. Then φ is the intersection of upper hemi-continuous correspondences and therefore
also upper hemi-continuous. Thus, by the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem there exists a fixed
point (v∗1 , . . . , v
∗
|A|2).
For each element v∗j of the fixed point, j = 1, . . . , |A|
2, there exists a probability distribution µ∗j
on A2 used to enforce it, since each is a PCE payoff. Then the device λM making recommendations
according to µ∗j for j = 1, . . . , |A|
2 is Markovian and incentive compatible by construction. 
4.2 Characterization of MPCE: Proof of Theorem I.1
Part (a) Factorization: First we show that if W is self-generating, then B(W ) ⊆ V ∗. For any
payoff vector w ∈ B(W ) there exists a pair (µ, k) that enforces w on W . Since W is self-generating,k(a, ã) ∈ W for all outcomes (a, ã). Each payoff k(a, ã) is enforced on W . In this way, we can (by
the Axiom of Choice) recursively define a PCE by constructing admissible pairs ad infinitum. By
Lemma I.1, the PCE payoff w is an MPCE payoff. Thus, W ⊆ V ∗. Next, we prove that V ∗ is
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a fixed point of B(·). Since V ∗ contains every self-generating set, we need only show that V ∗ is
self-generating. Consider an MPCE payoff w ∈ V ∗. There exists a pair (µ, k) such that k(a, ã) ∈ V ∗
for each pair of action and recommendation profiles (a, ã). Hence, w is admissible w.r.t. V ∗, or
equivalently that w ∈ B(V ∗).
Finally, suppose that there exists a fixed point W of B(·) that strictly contains V ∗. Then W
is self-generating, and so is contained in the MPCE set V ∗. This contradicts the premise that W
strictly contains V ∗. So V ∗ is the largest fixed point of B(·). 
Part (b) Compact and Convex: First, we want to show that B(W ) is compact if W is compact.
Since B(W ) is bounded, by the Heine-Borel Theorem it is compact if it is also closed. Consider a
sequence {bj} in B(W ) that converges to some b ∈ Rn. Each bj ∈ B(W ) is supported on W by an
admissible pair (µj , kj). Endow the space of such functions that map A×A2 into ∆(A)×W with
the weak-* topology (i.e. pointwise convergence). The sequence is bounded, and so by the Bolzano-
Weierstrass Theorem it has a convergent subsequence {µl, kl}. The weak inequalities that define
incentives are satisfied pointwise in the sequence {µl, kl}, and hence are also by the limit (µ, k),
which thus enforces b ∈ Rn. Then b ∈ B(W ), and so B(W ) is closed. 
Part (c) Contains SPE Payoffs: Since the mediated game has perfect monitoring of actions,
players may ignore the correlation device, and instead play the subgame perfect equilibrium behavior
after every history. 
Part (d) Nondecreasing δ: The proof is very similar to that of APS, Theorem 6. 
4.3 Algorithm: Proof of Theorem I.2
We extend the methods of Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003) to allow for correlation. Let W
be the set of all convex subsets of V , partially ordered by set inclusion. Then the operator B(·)
is monotone on the complete lattice W. By Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem, B(·) has a largest
fixed point V ∗. Let W 0 = V and recursively define W k = B(W k−1) for k = 1, 2, . . .. First, by
monotonicity V ∗ = B(V ∗) ⊆ B(W 0) = W 1. Next, suppose that V ∗ ⊆ W k. Monotonicity again
yields V ∗ = B(V ∗) ⊆ B(W k) =W k+1. By induction, V ∗ ⊆W k for all k = 1, 2, . . . ,
The sequence {W k}∞k=0 is bounded and monotone, and therefore converges (in the Hausdorff
topology) to a point in the complete lattice W. Let W∞ = limk→∞W k. This limit is a fixed point
of B(·), and by construction contains V ∗. But V ∗ cannot be a strict subset of W∞, since that
would imply that V ∗ is not the largest fixed point of B(·), contrary to Theorem I.1. 
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4.4 MPCE as an Upper Bound: Proof of Theorem I.3
At the information set hti, player i believes that the other players’ private history profile is h
t
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Player i’s continuation payoff under the strategy profile s at the private history hti is therefore
κti(h
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i, s). Then player i’s expected payoff under
the strategy profile s at the private history hti is
vti(s|h
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As is well-known, a strategy profile s is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there are no profitable













i, s̃i, s−i) + δκi(h
t
i|s̃i, s−i) (4.2)
for all players i, private histories hti, and strategies s̃i 6= si.
Recall that s and v denote, respectively, the strategy profiles and payoffs in Gψ(δ), and s and v
denote, respectively, the strategy profiles and payoffs in Gλ(δ).
Claim IV.2 (The Correlation Device). For any strategy profile s ∈ S of Gψ(δ), there exists a
correlation device λs ∈ Λ and strategy s ∈ S in the mediated game that induces the same outcome
in Gλs(δ) as s does in Gψ(δ).
Proof of Claim IV.2: For any strategy profile s ∈ S, let βt
(
at|(a1, . . . , at−1), s
)
be the induced
posterior probability of the action profile at in period t given the action history (a1, . . . , at−1). The
action mixture in period 1 is simply β1(a1) = α1(a). Given the realized action profile a1, action
profile a2 occurs with chance β2(a2|a1) =
∑
m1∈M ψ(m
1|a1)s(a2|a1,m1) using the joint density of
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signals ψ(·|a1). In general,
βt
(













For all action histories ht ∈ Ht, define λs(ht) = βt(·|s,ht). Then, the recommendation distribution
of λs coincides with the distribution of actions in Gψ(δ). Call s̄ the obedient strategy in Gλs(δ)
— namely, where players obey the recommendation of the correlation device λ after all histories.
Since λs recommends the same outcome as w, the obedient strategy s̄ in Gλs(δ) delivers the same
outcome as s. 
We must prove that obeying λs is a mutual best response, or vti (̄s|λs) ≥ vti(s′i, s̄−i|λs) ∀s′i ∈S. We’ll argue that for every deviation s′i ∈ Si in the mediated game, there is a corresponding
strategy s′i ∈ Si with vti(s′i, s̄−i|λs) = vti(s′i, s−i). Namely, any deviation in the meditated game
yields the same payoff as some strategy in the repeated game of private monitoring; this cannot
be a profitable deviation against the sequential equilibrium profile s−i. So vti (̄s|λs) = vti(s) ≥
vti(s
′
i, s−i) = vti(s′i, s̄|λs), as required.
Claim IV.3 (Verifying Incentives). If s ∈ S is a sequential equilibrium strategy of Gψ(δ), then the
correlation device λs ∈ Λ is a PCE of G(δ).
Proof of Claim IV.3: By the one-shot deviation principle, the obedient strategy is a best reply to
itself iff there is no history after which a player would choose to disobey his recommendation once,
and return to the obedient strategy thereafter. So, it suffices to restrict attention to alternative
strategies that differ from the obedient strategy in one history. Consider a history ht ∈ Ht at
which strategy s′i instead plays the action a′i in period t. Let H(ht) ⊆ Ht be the set of private
histories consistent with the action history portion of ht in the mediated game. At any private

























Thus, if s′i is a profitable deviation from that recommended by the device λs in the mediated
game, then there exists a profitable deviation in Gψ(δ). This would contradict the premise that
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s is a sequential equilibrium profile in Gψ(δ). Since any strategy in G
λs is equivalent to some
non-profitable deviation in Gψ(δ), the correlation device λs and the obedient strategy s̄ constitute
a PCE of G(δ). 
4.5 MPCE Inclusion is Tight: Proof of Theorem I.4
(⊆): Fix a game Gψ(δ), and consider a sequential equilibrium strategy profile s with payoff v.
Construct a PCE that induces the same outcome as s. Absent a pre-play signal, first period actions
owe to independent mixtures, and so the PCE recommends an independent mixture in the first
period. Next, by Lemma I.1, the continuation values prescribed by the PCE are in V ∗. Thus, the
payoff v is Nash enforced on V ∗. 
(⊇): We want to show that for every payoff w in BNE(V ∗), there exists a monitoring structure ψ
and a sequential equilibrium s of Gψ(δ) with the same payoff w. Consider one such payoff and the
pair (µ, k) that Nash enforces it on V ∗. Thus, for every action profile aj ∈ A, j = 1, . . . , |A|, there
is a payoff wj ∈ V ∗ that is enforced on V ∗ by the admissible pair (µj , kj). Let the monitoring
structure ψ provide perfect monitoring of actions, as well as a vector of private signals for each
player. In particular, after the action profile aj , each player privately observes his component of a
draw from µj . So defined, consider the following strategy profile s in Gψ(δ). “In the first period, mix
according to µ. Following every subsequent history, choose the action corresponding to the most
recently received message.” Since the private messages are MPCE recommendations, s constitutes
a Nash equilibrium. Then there exists a sequential equilibrium with the same path as s. So, there
exists a private monitoring sequential equilibrium with the payoff w. 
4.6 Sufficiency
Assume that P is more strategically informative than P . Let G ∈ Γn be an arbitrary game and
v ∈ Π(G,Q) an arbitrary Bayes-Nash equilibrium payoff attained by the strategy profile f . Since
P is a refinement of Q, the strategy profile f is measurable with respect to Q. Furthermore, since
Pi is conditionally independent of Q−i, f is still a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
4.7 Necessity
Suppose that P is more strategically informative than Q. Since Π(G,Q) ⊆ Π(G,P) for every
game G ∈ Γn, the inclusion in particular holds for all decision games : a game GDi in which
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players −i earn a payoff of zero for every action profile, and the remaining player i — the decision
maker — has non-null payoffs. Equilibrium strategies are by definition known to the decision maker,
and so this game is equivalent to a standard choice under uncertainty problem, where the players −i
(with null payoffs) take the role of Nature. Let Πi(G
Di ,P) be set of payoffs to admissible decision
rules in GDi . By Blackwell’s Theorem, the hypothesis Πi(G
Di ,Q) ⊆ Πi(GDi ,P) for all decision
games is equivalent to Pi being sufficient for Q−i. Then by the Fisher factorization theorem, Pi is
sufficient for Q−i if and only if Pi it can be factored into two terms, one of which is conditionally
independent of Q.
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